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This paper is about administrative adjudication, which for present purposes can be defined in 
terms of the resolution of disputes between citizen1 and government by means of reviewing 
decisions of government officials and agencies. There are (I suggest) two modes of 
administrative adjudication: judicial review and (adopting the Australian term) merits review. 
Judicial review, as its name implies, is conducted by (traditional) courts. Merits review is 
conducted by bodies that are commonly (although not universally) referred to – in the 
common law world outside the US, anyway – as (administrative) ‘tribunals’. The term 
‘tribunal’ is used in various senses; but for present purposes, it suffices to define a tribunal as 
an adjudicatory body that is not a court. In the US the equivalent institution is the 
independent or executive agency and, in particular, officials within agencies whose allotted 
task is (formal) adjudication in the sense in which that term is used in the Administrative 
Procedure Act 1946 (APA). Such officials are known as administrative law judges (ALJs) 
and administrative judges (AJs) – the former, unlike the latter, being appointed under the 
APA. For convenience, I will often use the term ‘tribunal’ to refer to such officials as well.  
 It will be immediately obvious that whereas the term ‘judicial review’ expressly refers 
to the institution that conducts the review, the term ‘merits review’, by contrast, refers to the 
basis of review. However, the former also implicitly refers to a set of grounds of review that 
define its basis; and it is with the basis or grounds of the two modes of review that this paper 
is primarily concerned. In other words, the paper is about the juridical nature of judicial 
review and merits review respectively. The paper is comparative in two dimensions: first, it 
                                                 
1 Or, as often in the case of immigration disputes, non-citizen. 
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compares the two modes of review, and secondly it compares the two modes of review in 
three jurisdictions – the US, the UK and Australia. 
 The jurisdictional comparison will pivot on Australia for two main reasons. First, 
understanding administrative adjudication requires an analysis of its constitutional 
foundations; and Australian federal constitutional law is a complex amalgam of British and 
American elements. Secondly, the concept of ‘merits review’ – in the sense of the mode of 
administrative adjudication conducted by non-courts – has a complex and highly developed 
technical meaning in Australian law that it lacks in the law of either the US or the UK. As a 
result, a much more sophisticated understanding of the juridical nature of ‘non-judicial’ 
review can gained by analysing Australian law than by studying the law of either the US or 
the UK.2 
 Outside Australia, there is surprisingly little literature about the nature of non-judicial 
review. Administrative lawyers in all three of our comparator jurisdictions tend to focus on 
judicial review and to marginalise tribunals and merits review. Discussion of tribunals tends 
to be concerned primarily with issues such as procedure and independence. It is generally 
acknowledged that tribunals are of great practical significance, if only because they resolve 
many more disputes between citizen and government than do courts; but they are rarely 
considered to be of much theoretical interest. This is partly because of the high status and the 
constitutional significance of courts; and partly because of the fact that in the US and the UK 
tribunals are commonly (but often unthinkingly) thought of as performing an essentially 
similar function to that of courts. In Australia, by contrast, tribunals are understood to be 
essentially different institutions from courts and to perform an essentially different function 
than courts. In fact – as we will see – in Australian law there are significant similarities 
                                                 
2 The most comprehensive account of merits review in Australia is D Pearce, Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 
2nd edn (LexisNexis Butterworths Australia, 2007). The research on which this paper is based was generously 
funded by the Australian Research Council. It draws on material in P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and 
Adjudication (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), forthcoming. 
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between the two modes of administrative adjudication; and in US and UK law there are, 
arguably, significant differences between them. Exploring such similarities and difference is 
a major aim of this paper. 
 The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 examines the 
development and meaning of the Australian concept of merits review. Sections 3 and 4 deal 
with the position in the UK and the US respectively, and section 5 draws together the 
discussion in the previous three sections and suggests that the characteristic function of 
tribunals in all three of our comparator jurisdictions is intense review of bureaucratic fact-
finding. 
2. Australia 
2.1 The Development of Merits Review 
Like much else, Australia borrowed the basic model of the administrative tribunal from 
England. The model administrative tribunal is a free-standing adjudicatory body that reviews 
decisions, made by the executive branch of government, which adversely affect citizens. 
Unlike the English constitution, however, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
(the federal level of government) is contained in a single document and embodies, like the 
US Constitution, a formal separation of powers: Chapter I deals with the legislature, Chapter 
II with the executive and Chapter III with the judiciary. However, the Constitution also 
establishes a system of responsible government in which ministers of state are required to be 
members of parliament (s 64); and for historical and pragmatic reasons, delegation of 
legislative power to the executive has been held to be consistent with the Constitution.3 On 
the other hand, the Constitution has been interpreted as requiring a rather strict separation of 
judicial power. The ‘dominant principle of demarcation’4 is that only Chapter III courts can 
                                                 
3 Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan  (1931) 46 CLR 73.  
4 New South Wales v The Commonwealth (the ‘Wheat case’) (1915) 20 CLR 54, 90 (Isaacs J) 
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exercise judicial power, and that Chapter III courts cannot perform non-judicial functions 
except those that are incidental to the exercise of judicial power.5 
 In a series of cases in the 1920s – commonly called ‘the taxation cases’6 – the High 
Court of Australia (and the English Privy Council on appeal from the High Court) were 
confronted by challenges to the constitutionality of the system for adjudicating disputes 
between taxpayers and the tax authorities. Taxpayers were originally given the choice of 
challenging determinations of the Commissioner of Taxation either in a Chapter III court or 
before a Taxation Board of Appeal, which was not a Chapter III court. Various features of 
this arrangement – such as the fact that there was a right of appeal from the Board to the High 
Court in its appellate jurisdiction – were held by the High Court to involve unconstitutional 
conferment of judicial power on the Board of Appeal. The relevant legislation was 
subsequently amended to replace the Board of Appeal with a Board of Review. Critical 
features of the new arrangement were that in reviewing determinations of the Commissioner, 
the Board was expressed to have ‘all the powers and functions’ of the Commissioner, and the 
decision of the Board was deemed to be a decision of the Commissioner. Partly on this basis, 
it was held by both the High Court and the Privy Council that in adjudicating disputes 
between taxpayers and the Commissioner, the Board of Review was exercising non-judicial 
power with which, being a non-judicial body, it was validly invested. 
 Perhaps the chief significance of the taxation cases was that they cleared the way for 
the use of non-judicial tribunals to adjudicate disputes between citizen and government, thus 
providing much-needed supplementation of the relatively meagre adjudicatory resources 
available in the then-existing Chapter III courts. As acknowledged by Isaacs J who was, 
                                                 
5 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; affirmed on appeal by the Privy 
Council: Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 
529. 
6 British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 35 CLR 422; Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153; Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1930) 44 
CLR 530. 
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ironically, the chief architect of the dominant principle of demarcation,7 the rapid growth of 
government involvement in economic and social life in the early 20th century (coupled with 
an unwillingness to swell the ranks of the Chapter III judiciary by creating new courts) made 
recognition of the constitutionality of arrangements for non-judicial administrative 
adjudication a practical necessity.8  
 The decisions in the taxation cases were based on the principle that judicial functions 
cannot be conferred on non-judicial bodies. The corollary (and more controversial) principle, 
that non-judicial functions cannot be conferred on judicial bodies unless incidental to the 
exercise of judicial power, was not established until 1957.9 The latter principle underpinned 
reasoning central to the 1971 Report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review 
Committee (the ‘Kerr Committee’).10  The Committee was established primarily to consider a 
proposal for a new federal court to review ‘administrative decisions’. Its recommendations in 
this regard led to the creation of the Federal Court of Australia in 1976 and the enactment of 
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1976, which created a statutory regime of 
judicial review alongside the existing common law regime. However, the Committee also 
considered that because judicial review was concerned only with the ‘legality’ of 
administrative decisions, it needed to be supplemented by general provision for review of 
decisions ‘on the merits’. In the Committee’s opinion, reviewing the merits of administrative 
decisions (as opposed to their legality) would typically involve the exercise of non-judicial 
power. It followed that the merits review function could not be conferred on a judicial body. 
The Committee therefore recommended the creation of a (non-judicial) general 
administrative appeals tribunal on which would be conferred power to review the ‘merits’ of 
a wide range of administrative decisions. Although the Committee did not explicitly 
                                                 
7 See n 2 above 
8 See particularly Isaacs J’s judgment in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro. 
9 See n 3 above. 
10 Parliamentary Paper No 144 of 1971. 
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recognise the fact, it had invented a new adjudicatory function – merits review – which, being 
a non-judicial, was to be understood as categorically different from judicial review, a judicial 
function. 
 The model adopted for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was that of the 
Taxation Board of Review, approved by the High Court and the Privy Council 50 years 
earlier. On review, the AAT has the power to affirm or vary a decision or to set it aside and 
make a substitute decision or remit it to the decision-maker for reconsideration.11 The AAT 
‘may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any relevant enactment on 
the person who made the decision’; and when the AAT varies a decision or makes a 
substitute decision, its decision is deemed to be the decision of the original decision-maker. 
Out of these sparse provisions the AAT and the Federal Court have developed a complex 
concept of merits review that describes the main function of the AAT and other federal 
administrative tribunals that operate in areas such as social security and immigration. The 
AAT exercises a mix of first-tier and second-tier merits review jurisdiction. The former 
involves reviewing decisions of bureaucrats and the latter involves reviewing (on their 
merits) decisions of first-tier (merits review) tribunals (such as social security appeal 
tribunals but not, notably, immigration tribunals). Decisions of the AAT can be appealed to 
the Federal Court on a point of law, and the AAT is subject, in theory at least, to judicial 
review by the Federal Court. 
 The extent to which the concept of merits review has taken on a life of its own is 
witnessed by its adoption in the Australian states. Unlike the Commonwealth Constitution, 
the constitutions of the states do not embody a formal separation of powers. As a result, there 
is, in principle, no bar to the conferral of non-judicial power on state courts or to the conferral 
                                                 
11 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act), s 43. 
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of judicial power on state tribunals.12 It might be expected, therefore, that the distinction 
between judicial review and merits review would find no place in state law. However, there 
are various state adjudicatory bodies – some called ‘tribunals’ and others called ‘courts’ – 
that exercise a mix of judicial review and merits review jurisdiction. In the state context, the 
concept of merits review is essentially similar to that developed by the AAT and the Federal 
Court at the federal level. In Australian law, at both federal and state level, merits review has 
come to be understood as describing a mode of administrative adjudication distinct and 
different from judicial review. 
2.2 The Concept of Merits Review 
The concept of merits review can be said to have three elements, which might loosely be 
called the substantive, the procedural and the remedial. The substantive element is 
encapsulated in the principle that the task of a merits reviewer is to ensure that the ‘correct or 
preferable’ decision is made.13 The procedural element is colloquially captured in the idea 
that the merits reviewer ‘stands in the shoes of the primary decision-maker’. The remedial 
element relates to the powers of the merits reviewer when it reviews a decision. 
2.2.1 The Substantive Element of Merits Review 
Although the Kerr Committee (perhaps unwittingly) invented the concept of merits review, it 
said very little about its nature beyond contrasting review on the merits with legality-based 
review. Similarly, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act) (like subsequent 
statutes modelled on it) contains no indication of the criteria according to which the AAT 
should exercise its various remedial powers. The ‘correct or preferable’ standard of merits 
review – which is a judicial invention14 – refers, in abstract terms, to norms of good decision-
making departure from which triggers the remedial jurisdiction of the AAT and application of 
                                                 
12 Indeed, the categorical distinction between judicial bodies (courts) and non-judicial bodies (tribunals) found 
in federal law is absent from state law. 
13 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60, 68 (Bowen CJ and Deane J). 
14 See previous note. 
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which underpins exercise by the AAT of its various remedial powers, and in particular the 
powers to vary a decision and to make a substitute decision. ‘Correct’ in this formula is taken 
to refer to situations in which the reviewer considers that there is only one acceptable 
decision; and ‘preferable’ refers to situations where it considers that there is more than one 
acceptable decision. 
 In an early decision of the AAT, its first President (Brennan J) said that ‘[t]here is no 
dichotomy between the administrative standards upon which the Tribunal must insist… and 
the principles of law which are applied by a court : administrative action which exceeds the 
power conferred is not only ineffective in point of law, but it constitutes unacceptable 
administrative conduct’.15 Thus, a merits reviewer may intervene if it considers that the 
primary decision was not the correct or preferable one as a result of procedural unfairness, or 
of some defect of reasoning – such as taking account of an irrelevant consideration or 
exercising a power for an improper purpose, or because the decision-maker made an error of 
law or fact, or because the decision was unreasonable. Because these are all grounds of 
judicial review as well as triggers for the exercise of the remedial powers of a merits 
reviewer, the question that inevitably arises is whether there are any substantive differences 
between judicial review and merits review. Three issues deserve some attention: review of 
government policy, review for error of law and review for error of fact. 
2.2.1.1 Policy Review 
In this context, policies are non-statutory decision-making norms. In Australian judicial 
review law, a decision may be illegal if it is based on a policy that is inconsistent with a rule 
of law, or on application of a policy without proper regard to the facts of the particular case,16 
or on refusal to apply an announced policy without good reason.17 A decision may also be 
held illegal if it is based on a policy that the court considers to be ‘so unreasonable that no 
                                                 
15 Re Brian Lawlor Automotive and Collector of Customs (1978) 1 ALD 167, 177. 
16 Policies, lacking the force of law, must be applied flexibly. 
17 At least, without giving the affected person a chance to argue for the application of the policy. 
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reasonable decision-maker could apply it’. This is known as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’, 
and it sets a very high threshold for judicial intervention. In Australian merits review law, it 
is clear that such defects may justify the conclusion that a decision is not the correct or 
preferable one. The more difficult question is whether a merits reviewer may intervene when 
the policy on which the decision is based, although not Wednesbury-unreasonable is, 
nevertheless, in the opinion of the reviewer, not the preferable one. In other words, how free 
is a merits reviewer to depart from government policy in deciding whether a decision is 
correct or preferable? The doctrine of the separation of judicial power is taken to permit 
courts to reject government policy only in extreme cases. However, merits reviewers exercise 
non-judicial, and not judicial, power, and this fact may be thought to support greater freedom 
in judging the merits of government policy. 
 Brennan J addressed such issues in one of the Tribunal’s earliest decisions. The 
AAT’s powers, he said, are wide enough to ‘permit the sterilization or amendment of 
policy…in point of law, the Tribunal is as free as the Minister to apply or not to apply 
policy…[it] is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses, or no policy at all’.18 On the 
other hand, Brennan J said, the Tribunal is essentially a ‘curial’, not an ‘administrative’ 
body,19 and its basic responsibility is to apply policy, not make it. ‘The detachment which is 
desirable for adjudication’, he added, ‘is not in sympathy with the purposiveness of policy 
formation’.20 In other words, although merits review tribunals are non-judicial bodies, 
because of their basically adjudicatory function, it is inappropriate for them to pronounce 
upon the merits of the policies on which decisions are based as opposed to the merits of the 
decision itself relative to those policies. In practice, Australian merits reviewers are no more 
willing than courts to question government policy. Indeed, in some of the Australian states, 
                                                 
18 Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 634, 642. 
19 Ibid, 643. 
20 Ibid. 
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there are statutory provisions designed to limit the freedom of merits reviewers to depart 
from government policy. 
2.2.1.2 Error of Law 
In Australian law, ‘merits review’ has become a highly technical concept. However, there is 
also a less formal and more basic sense in which the ‘merits’ of a decision are contrasted with 
its ‘legality’. Legality is the province of judicial review while the merits (in this less formal 
sense) are the province of merits review. Theoretically, a decision that is lawful and, as a 
result, immune from judicial review, may nevertheless not be the correct or preferable one, in 
which case it might open to a merits reviewer to vary the decision or make a decision in 
substitution for it. Conversely, it might seem to follow that if a decision is unlawful, the 
question of whether it is the correct or preferable one would never arise: if a decision is 
illegal, whether it is good or bad is of no concern. So does a merits reviewer have jurisdiction 
to review an illegal (purported) decision and to set it aside on the ground that it is contrary to 
law (regardless of its merits)? This was one of the first questions that the AAT was required 
to answer; and the Tribunal’s decision that it did have such power21 established that although 
merits reviewers (unlike courts exercising judicial review jurisdiction) can review 
administrative decisions ‘on the merits’, this is not all they can do: they can also decide 
questions of law.22   
 More generally, the AAT’s decision established that judicial review and merits review 
are, in their substantive dimension, overlapping rather than mutually exclusive functions. 
Merits review, we might say, is enhanced judicial review in the sense that (any and all of) the 
norms of good decision-making departure from which can render a decision illegal can also 
                                                 
21 Re Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1978) 1 ALD 167; affirmed Collector 
of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 2 ALD 1; reaffirmed Secretary, Department of 
Social Security v Alvaro (1994) 34 ALD 72. 
22 However, merits review tribunals cannot answer questions of law ‘conclusively’, this being a judicial 
function. The exact meaning of this term is unclear, but it’s practical effect is that statements of law by merits 
review tribunals are a form of soft law. 
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prevent it being the correct or preferable decision. On the other hand, it does not follow frm 
the fact that a decision is lawful that it is also the correct or preferable decision. 
2.2.1.3 Error of Fact 
This conclusion is best and most clearly illustrated by reference to errors of fact which, in the 
relevant sense, result from giving too little or too much weight to the available evidence. In 
general, in Australian law such errors do not provide a ground for judicial review, whereas 
failure to give appropriate weight to the evidence is one of the most important and common 
justifications for holdings by merits reviewers that the decision in question was not the 
correct or preferable one. Indeed, it has been said that one of the reasons why courts are 
relatively unwilling to review fact-finding by administrators is precisely that doing so is one 
of the prime functions of merits review tribunals.23 Moreover, in those types of case in which 
courts will review decisions on questions of fact, the tests used to determine whether or not 
the decision is lawful tend to leave the decision-maker considerable discretion and to justify 
holdings of illegality only in extreme cases. By contrast, the ‘correct or preferable’ formula 
of merits review gives the reviewer much more freedom to reassess the evidence and its 
weight. We saw in 2.2.1.2 that merits reviewers appear just as unwilling as courts to review 
bureaucratic policy-making. By contrast, reviewing bureaucratic fact-finding is understood to 
be their core business.  
 We may summarise the discussion of the substantive element of merits review by 
saying that it is in the area of review of fact-finding that it differs most from judicial review 
and involves much greater external scrutiny of bureaucratic decision-making. 
2.2.2 The Procedural Element of Merits Review 
                                                 
23 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 340. 
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Central to the concept of merits review is the idea that the reviewer ‘stands in the shoes of the 
primary decision-maker’.24 This colloquialism paraphrases statutory provisions that allow the 
reviewer to exercise (any and all of) the powers and discretions vested in the primary 
decision-maker and that deem the reviewer’s decision – when the reviewer varies the primary 
decision or makes a substitute decision – to be the decision of the primary decision-maker. 
These provisions mark a fundamental difference between merits review and judicial review. 
Whereas the main function of the judicial reviewer is to examine the decision for defects and 
to invalidate the decision if it is defective, the main function of the merits reviewer is to bring 
it about that the correct or preferable decision is made. Like the judicial reviewer, the merits 
reviewer may do this by affirming the original decision or remitting it to the primary 
decision-maker for reconsideration. But very commonly, the merits reviewer will achieve the 
required outcome by doing something that judicial reviewers typically have no power to do – 
namely varying the original decision or making a new decision in substitution for it. In doing 
so, the reviewer may exercise any relevant power available to the primary decision-maker 
whether or not the latter purported to exercise that power in making the original decision. 
 Nevertheless, despite its beguiling simplicity, the idea that the reviewer stands in the 
shoes of the primary decision-maker is complex and problematic. For one thing, when a 
merits reviewer affirms the primary decision or sets it aside and remits it to the primary 
decision-maker for reconsideration, the reviewer exercises a power of its own, not a power of 
the original decision-maker. More significantly, a tribunal typically has much more time and 
many more resources to devote to reviewing the decision than bureaucrats can typically 
devote to individual cases. Moreover, merits review is conducted not on the basis of the 
relevant facts as they were at the date the primary decision was made but on the basis of the 
relevant facts as at the date of review (in other words, the record remains open until the date 
                                                 
24 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139, 143 (Smithers J) 
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of review and the reviewer can receive new evidence that was not available to the primary 
decision-maker). Under certain circumstances, the merits reviewer can even take account of 
changes in the law since the original decision was made.  
 Unless used carefully, there is a danger that the shoe metaphor will blind us to such 
distinctions between primary decision-making and merits review, and cause 
‘misunderstanding…between decision-makers…and reviewers’25 based on lack of 
appreciation of the significant differences between the respective roles of the former and the 
latter. 
2.2.3 The Remedial Element of Merits Review 
As we have seen, a merits reviewer may affirm or vary the decision under review, or set the 
decision aside and either make a substitute decision or remit the decision to the primary 
decision-maker for reconsideration. In practice, the archetypal merits review remedy is to set 
the decision aside and make a substitute decision. Merits reviewers rarely remit decisions for 
reconsideration, and in principle should do so only if the reviewer considers that the primary 
decision-maker is in a better position than the reviewer to make the correct of preferable 
decision. By contrast, the archetypal judicial review remedy is setting aside and remittal to 
the primary decision-maker. This difference reflects the fact that courts are judicial bodies 
exercising judicial power while merits review tribunals are non-judicial bodies exercising 
non-judicial power. The power to make a decision in substitution for that of an executive 
officer or agency (as opposed to a lower court) is, in theory, a non-judicial power, and so 
could not (in principle, at least) be conferred on a court.26 
                                                 
25 S Hamilton, ‘The Future of Public Administration: The Future of Administrative Law’ in R Creyke and J 
McMillan (eds), The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law – At the Twenty-Five Year Mark (Canberra: 
Centre for International and Public Law, 1998), 118. 
26 There is a right of appeal ‘on a question of law’ from the AAT to the Federal Court. Such an appeal is 
functionally equivalent to a judicial review application and engages the original, not the appellate, jurisdiction 
of the court. The Federal Court has no express power to make a decision in substitution for that of the AAT, and 
it rarely does so. Since 2005 it has had power to make findings of fact that are consistent with the findings of the 
AAT and, for that purpose, to admit new evidence. The constitutionality of these provisions, and of the Federal 
Court’s occasional practice of making a decision in substitution for that of the AAT, have not been tested. 
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 In Australian federal law, an important difference between courts (judicial reviewers) 
and tribunals (merits reviewers) arises from the fact that the power to make enforceable 
decisions is considered to be judicial. It follows that tribunals, being non-judicial bodies, 
cannot be given the power to enforce their own decisions; and also that in enforcement 
proceedings before a court, the tribunal’s decision must be ‘reviewed’ by the court.27 
2.3 Merits Review and Judicial Review 
We can summarize the foregoing discussion by saying that because of the strong principle of 
separation of judicial power that the High Court has read out of (or in to) the Australian 
Constitution, there is a categorical distinction in Australian law between judicial review and 
merits review. This distinction is clearest in respect of what I have dubbed the procedural and 
remedial elements of merits review. The archetypal judicial review remedy is setting aside 
and remittal, while the archetypal merits review remedies are varying the decision and 
making a substitute decision. In dispensing the characteristic merits review remedy, the 
reviewer exercises by proxy powers available to the primary decision-maker, whereas in 
dispensing the characteristic judicial review remedy courts exercise inherent judicial power. 
Judicial review is typically based on the material available, to and the reasons for decision 
given by, the primary decision-maker, and on the law as it stood at the time the original 
decision was made.28 By contrast, merits review can take account of material available at the 
time of review, even if it was not available at the time the decision was made, and of changes 
in the law since that time. Moreover, in reconsidering the decision, the merits reviewer is not 
limited to the powers actually exercised by the primary decision-maker or to the matters 
raised before or the reasons given by the primary decision-maker. The basic function of the 
judicial reviewer is the negative task of identifying any defects in the decision under review 
whereas the basic function of the merits reviewer is the positive task of bringing it about that 
                                                 
27 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245. 
28 Kavvadias v The Commonwealth Ombudsman (No 2) (1984) 6 ALD 198, 206. 
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the correct or preferable decision is made. The merits reviewer is a decision maker in an 
important sense in which the judicial reviewer is not. 
 In what I have dubbed the ‘substantive’ respect, however, the relationship between 
the two modes of administrative adjudication is rather more complex. Because the basic task 
of the judicial reviewer is the negative one of determining whether the decision under review 
is defective in some sense (or, in other words, of policing limits on decision-making power) 
the ‘grounds’ of judicial review are expressed negatively – illegality, procedural unfairness, 
unreasonableness and so on – even though they imply positive criteria of good decision-
making which judicial review can be thought of as promoting – legality, procedural fairness, 
reasonableness and so on. Although the function of the merits reviewer is positively to secure 
the correct or preferable decision, it is an implicit precondition of the exercise of the 
reviewer’s remedial powers that it decide whether or not the decision under review is the 
correct or preferable one. It cannot avoid this (negative) step in the review process because its 
power to affirm the decision can be exercised only if it is the correct or preferable one, and its 
other powers can be exercised only if the decision is not the correct or preferable one. In 
other words, the merits reviewer has the dual task of negatively deciding whether the decision 
under review is the correct or preferable one and, if it is not, of positively bringing it about 
that the correct or preferable decision is made.  
 Unsurprisingly, the criteria of good decision making that – in their negative form – 
are used to determine whether the merits reviewer should affirm the decision on the one 
hand, or vary it or set it aside on the other, are the very same criteria that inform the 
reviewer’s own process of making the correct and preferable decision (if it decides to vary 
the decision or make a substitute decision) and which should guide the primary decision-
maker’s reconsideration of the decision (if the reviewer decides to remit the decision). As we 
have seen, the criteria of good decision-making that perform this dual function in merits 
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review are essentially similar to those implied by the negatively framed grounds of judicial 
review – legality, procedural fairness, reasonableness and so on. Judicial review and merits 
review promote similar bureaucratic values associated with good decision-making. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between the ‘merits’ of a decision and its ‘legality’ is said to be 
central to the concepts of merits review and judicial review. Whereas judicial review is said 
to be limited to issues of legality, merits review (by definition) ‘goes to the merits’. Because 
the same foundational criteria of good decision-making are promoted by judicial review and 
merits review alike, the substantive distinction between legality and merits can be, at most, 
one of degree, not one of kind. Legality and merits are merely points on a continuum 
representing the degree to which bureaucratic compliance with norms of good decision-
making is subject to external scrutiny and to which non-compliance with such norms is 
remediable. 
3. The UK 
In 19th-century England, non-judicial administrative adjudication was commonly undertaken 
within non-departmental, multi-functional agencies charged with responsibility for 
administering statutory programs of regulation and welfare.29 Adjudicators ‘embedded’ in 
this way within agencies were seen, for various reasons, to be better suited than courts to 
resolving disputes between citizens and government. In the course of the century, the rule-
making and administrative functions of many such agencies were transferred to government 
departments, leaving adjudication of disputes either to a court or to a non-judicial body. One 
effect of this process was to make more obvious the similarities between judicial and non-
judicial administrative adjudicators (tribunals and courts). In short, tribunals and courts came 
to be understood as performing essentially similar functions.  
                                                 
29 See generally C Stebbings, Legal Foundations of Tribunals in Nineteenth Century England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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 By the early 20th century the model of the free-standing, mono-functional 
administrative tribunal had become firmly established. In the 1920s and 1930s there were 
vigorous debates about the principles according to which the task of administrative 
adjudication should be allocated respectively to courts, tribunals and government agencies. 
Scholars such as William Robson30 and lawyers such as Lord Chief Justice Hewart31 argued 
strongly in favour of external adjudicators. The Donoughmore Committee, by contrast, 
proposed a division of functions, primarily between courts (external) and departmental 
ministers (internal), on the basis of an unsatisfactory distinction between judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative functions, which was in turn based on a difficult contrast between 
law and policy.32 Only in exceptional cases were tribunals to be preferred to courts on the one 
hand and ministers on the other. A quarter of a century later, the Franks Committee 
reaffirmed the Donoughmore Committee’s preference for courts over tribunals as external 
administrative adjudicators.33 By this stage, the model of internal, embedded adjudication 
was more-or-less limited to public inquiries associated with the land-use planning process, 
where it continues to operate in a manner not dissimilar to adjudication within US agencies. 
So far as tribunals were concerned, the Franks Committee made the crucial conceptual move 
of asserting that they should properly be understood as part of the judicial process, not part of 
the administrative process. On this basis, the Committee’s main concern was to ensure that 
tribunals displayed and promoted the (essentially judicial) procedural virtues of ‘openness, 
fairness and impartiality’. 
 The association of tribunals with the judicial branch was taken a large step further by 
the Review of Tribunals chaired by Sir Andrew Leggatt. The provisions of the Courts, 
Tribunals and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCE Act) dealing with tribunals are based on the 2001 
                                                 
30 Justice and Administrative Law (London: Macmillan, 1928). A 2nd edition was published in 1947 and a 3rd in 
1951. 
31 The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929). 
32 Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Cmnd 4060 (1932). 
33 Report of the Committee on Tribunals and Enquiries, Cmnd 218 (1957). 
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report of the Review, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service. A major thrust of these 
provisions is to reinforce the identification of tribunals with courts. For instance, legally-
qualified members of tribunals are now called ‘judges’; a disparate collection of subject-
specific tribunals are being amalgamated into a two-tier structure in which the main function 
of the Upper Tribunal is to hear appeals from the lower, First-tier Tribunal; and the Upper 
Tribunal has been given limited judicial review jurisdiction in addition to its appellate 
jurisdiction. It is not going too far to say that in this new regime, tribunals are effectively a 
species of court or, perhaps, that tribunals and courts are two species of the genus of 
adjudicator. 
 Tribunals, in one form or another, have been the subject of vigorous debate in the UK 
for the best part of two centuries. Nevertheless, discussion has tended to focus on procedure, 
the institutional aspects of administrative adjudication and the structure of the tribunal 
‘system’. Much less has been said or written about what tribunals actually do or, in the 
language used earlier in this paper, about the juridical nature of non-judicial administrative 
adjudication. One of the catalysts for the development of the Australian concept of merits 
review was the establishment of a general (as opposed to a ‘specialist’ or subject-specific) 
administrative appeals tribunal (the AAT), which now has jurisdiction to review decisions 
made under more than 400 statutes covering a very wide range of government activities. 
Importantly, too, significant decisions of the AAT are reported, as are significant decisions of 
the Federal Court on appeal from the AAT. The TCE Act has now established such a tribunal 
in the UK, but the Act itself says very little about the juridical nature of the new tribunals’ 
tasks – indeed, it contains no provisions describing in general terms the function of the First-
tier Tribunal in making initial decisions (although it does say something about its role when 
reviewing its own decisions). In relation to decisions of the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper 
Tribunal is, in some respects, cast in the role of a merits reviewer – for instance, it has the 
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power, on appeal, to make a decision in substitution for that of the First-tier Tribunal. In other 
respects, however, it is conceived as an appellate court – for instance, its jurisdiction is 
limited to points of law, and it has the power to make findings of fact. 
 It might be expected that the Upper Tribunal will, in the years to come, make 
significant contributions to our understanding of what UK tribunals do and how it relates to 
what courts do. In the meantime, however, since the jurisdiction of the new tribunals is 
constituted by transfer to it of the jurisdiction of existing subject-specific tribunals, we need 
to look at the legislation relevant to those particular tribunals and to decisions of those 
tribunals for an appreciation of pre-TCE Act understandings of the role of tribunals in the 
UK. Here I will deal with social security and immigration tribunals, which are two of the 
most important sets of tribunals in the UK system. The discussion is cast in terms that ignore 
the impact of the TCE Act. 
 Appeals to social security appeal tribunals are governed by s 12 of the Social Security 
Act 1998. This provision says almost nothing about the powers of the tribunal. However, the 
leading decision of the Social Security and Child Support Commissioners (SSCSCs) (the 
highest tribunal in the social security adjudication system) establishes that an appeal to a 
social security appeal tribunal is by way of a complete rehearing of issues of fact and law.34 
The ‘appeal tribunal is designed to be a superior fact finding body’.35 Its basic task is to make 
what it considers to be the correct decision, and in doing so it ‘may make any decision which 
the officer below could have made’.36 The ‘appeal tribunal’s jurisdiction is not limited to 
affirming [the decision under appeal] or alternatively setting aside the decision’ and remitting 
it to the decision-maker.37 The tribunal ‘in effect stands in the shoes of the decision-maker’.38 
                                                 
34 SSCSC Case R(IB) 2/04. See also SSCSC R(IS) 17/04, [26]. 
35 Ibid, [14]. 
36 Ibid, [24].  
37 Ibid, [15]. By contrast, under s 120 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK) the Competition Appeal Tribunal, in 
hearing appeals from decisions of the Office of Fair Trading, the Secretary of State or the Competition 
Commission, may only quash the whole or part of a decision and refer the matter back to the original decision-
 20 
Moreover, its jurisdiction is ‘inquisitorial or investigatory’ in the sense that it may consider 
issues relevant to making the correct decision even if they are not raised by the parties to the 
appeal.39 Unlike an Australian merits review tribunal, however, a social security appeal 
tribunal may not ‘take into account circumstances not obtaining at the time when the decision 
appealed against was made’.40  
 It has also been held that because a social security appeal tribunal is a ‘purely judicial 
body’, it cannot entertain appeals against exercises of discretion that involve consideration of 
‘non-justiciable’ issues. Any appeal against such a discretionary decision is limited to ‘points 
of law’ understood in terms of the grounds of judicial review.41 In principle, there is an 
important distinction here between a UK social security appeal tribunal and an Australian 
merits review tribunal. The main reason given by the Kerr Committee for classifying merits 
review as a non-judicial function was that the task of reviewing discretionary decisions would 
typically involve the consideration of ‘non-justiciable’ issues. The clear implication is that 
merits review tribunals would have the power to decide non-justiciable issues. In practice (as 
we have seen), the AAT takes a very cautious approach to reviewing the exercise of 
administrative discretions and government policy. Nevertheless, in principle the distinction 
between justiciable and non-justiciable issues does not mark the boundary of the AAT’s 
competence. Indeed, to the contrary, there is no technical bar to the AAT considering non-
justiciable issues in the course of reviewing decisions. The substantive essence of merits 
review, in the Australian sense, is precisely that it extends beyond law and legality. 
 An appeal lies from a decision of an appeal tribunal to an SSCSC on a point of law. 
On appeal, if the decision is set aside, the Commissioner may make fresh or further findings 
                                                                                                                                                        
maker. In deciding appeals, the Tribunal is to ‘apply the same principles as would be applied by a court on an 
application for judicial review’. 
38Case R(H) 3/04, [25]. 
39 Ibid, [31]-[32]. 
40 Social Security Act 1998 (UK), s 12(8)(b). 
41 SSCSC Cases R(H) 3/04 and R(H) 6/06. 
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of fact and make a substitute decision or, alternatively, refer the case back to the tribunal with 
directions for its determination.42 Decisions of the SSCSCs on matters of law are binding on 
appeal tribunals and on primary decision-makers. This reflects the fact that tribunals in the 
UK are understood to be exercising judicial power.43 By contrast, binding precedent has no 
place in the Australian merits review system not only because merits review tribunals – at the 
federal level, at least – cannot conclusively decide questions of law (this being a judicial 
function),44 but also because it is considered to be inconsistent with the basic task of such a 
tribunal – namely to bring it about that the correct or preferable decision is made in the 
individual case before the tribunal. 
 The understanding of the role of the SSCSCs as being judicial is also reflected in the 
fact that they ‘often’ set aside decisions because they are based on flawed reasoning and 
substitute a decision to the same effect but based on sound reasoning.45 By contrast, in 
Australian merits-review law a sharp distinction is drawn between the decision and 
supporting reasoning. The task of the merits reviewer relates only to the decision. The 
remedial powers of the reviewer are not engaged by flawed reasoning unless it has led to the 
making of an incorrect decision. 
 Under s 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK),46 ‘where an 
immigration decision is made in respect of a person he may appeal to’ the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal (AIT), which is a first-tier reviewer staffed by ‘Immigration Judges’. 
As its name indicates, the AIT deals with both asylum and other immigration matters. The 
grounds of appeal are set out in s 84 of the 2002 Act. They fall into three categories: (a) 
                                                 
42 Social Security Act 1998 (UK), s 14(8). For an example of a case in which the SSCSCs refused to make 
findings of fact and referred the matter back see SSCSC Case R(IS) 17/04. 
43 On the concept of precedent as it applies to tribunals generally see T Buck, ‘Precedent in Tribunals and the 
Development of Principles’ (2006) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 458.  
44 See n 22 above. 
45 D Bonner (ed), Social Security Legislation 2007, Volume III: Administration, Adjudication and the European 
Dimension (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), 245, 247. This practice raises important an difficult issues, and 
its legitimacy may be open to question in the light of the decision in Office of Communications v Floe Telecom 
Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 47. 
46 As amended by the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004.  
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inconsistency with the Immigration Rules; 47 (b) inconsistency with domestic or EC law; and 
(c) incompatibility with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The AIT’s powers are to ‘dismiss’ or ‘allow’ the appeal. The grounds on which an appeal can 
be allowed are (1) that the decision was not in accordance with the law (including the 
immigration rules) and (2) that a discretion exercised in making the decision should have 
been exercised differently. In addition to the ECHR, domestic and EC law, and the 
Immigration Rules, immigration decision-making is also regulated by extra-statutory 
‘policies’ under which immigrants may be allowed to enter the UK even if not entitled to do 
so by any of the first three categories of provision. By statute, the AIT has no power to 
review an exercise of discretion under a policy if the decision in question is in accordance 
with the Rules. In other words, discretionary application, non-application or misapplication 
of an extra-statutory policy is not a ground of appeal, although such conduct may be relevant 
in deciding whether some other ground of appeal (such as unlawfulness or incompatibility 
with a Convention right) has been made out.48 
 It follows from this rule about review of discretions exercised outside the Immigration 
Rules that the basis on which the AIT may allow appeals on the basis of application, non-
application or misapplication of departmental policies is the same as that on which a court, 
conducting a judicial review, may quash a decision for a policy-related reason, namely, that 
application or non-application of the policy, or the way the policy was applied was 
inconsistent with some legal rule or principle. Unlike the AAT, the AIT may not – even in 
theory – consider the merits of the policy. Only if a policy is in ‘absolute terms’ that leave the 
decision-maker with no discretion or where, ‘on the facts of the case there is no proper 
opportunity, by application of the policy, to make a decision unfavourable to the claimant’,49 
                                                 
47 The Immigration Rules are a form of soft law, although not as soft as departmental ‘policies’. 
48 AG and others (policies; executive discretions; Tribunal’s powers) Kosovo [2007] UKAIT 00082, [44]. 
49 Ibid, [48]. 
 23 
can the AIT allow an appeal on the ground of non-application or misapplication of the policy 
(and in such circumstances, the basis of the AIT’s decision would be unlawfulness).  
 The characteristic function of the AIT is to decide, on the basis of a full 
reconsideration of the facts,50 whether either of the grounds on which an appeal can be 
allowed has been established. Although the AIT’s power is to ‘allow’ or ‘dismiss’ the appeal, 
in practical terms the effect of allowing an appeal will typically be substitution of a decision 
in favour of the appellant. However, the AIT may remit the matter for reconsideration by the 
primary decision-maker. 
 The task of the AIT, when deciding appeals alleging incompatibility with Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), was considered by the House of Lords 
in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department.51 That task, the House said, was not 
a secondary, reviewing, function dependent on establishing that the primary decision-
maker misdirected himself or acted irrationally or was guilty of procedural 
impropriety. The appellate immigration authority must decide for itself whether the 
impugned decision is lawful and, if not, but only if not, reverse it.52 
The House went on to contrast the role of the appellate immigration authority (for present 
purposes, the AIT) with that of a court reviewing a decision on the ground of incompatibility 
with Art 8 of the ECHR. Such review requires the court (like the AIT when deciding an 
appeal on this ground) to determine the legality of a decision by applying a test of 
proportionality, as opposed to the less intrusive test of Wednesbury unreasonableness. The 
House quoted a statement to the effect that although more intrusive than the unreasonableness 
test, the proportionality test does not require the court to engage in ‘merits review’.53 This 
                                                 
50 Eg AA v Entry Clearance Officer (Nigeria) [2004] IKIAT 00019, [5]. 
51 [2007] 2 AC 167. 
52 Ibid, [11]. 
53 For an early explicit recognition in the UK of the distinction between review for legality and merits review 
see Committee of the JUSTICE-All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom, 
Administrative Justice: Some Necessary Reforms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 211-12. 
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was interpreted to mean that in applying the proportionality test, the court does not act as a 
‘primary decision-maker’ with the task of deciding what decision ought to have been made; 
rather it reviews the decision of another decision-maker. By contrast, in exercising its 
appellate function the AIT does not review the decision of another decision-maker but rather 
decides ‘whether or not [the decision] is unlawful…on the basis of up to date facts’.54 
Moreover, like the AAT, the AIT is ‘much better placed [than the primary decision-maker] to 
investigate the facts’.55 
 Like appeals to the AIT on the ground of incompatibility with Art 8 of the ECHR, 
asylum appeals are also decided on this basis of the facts as they are at the time of the appeal. 
By contrast, immigration (as opposed to asylum) appeals are generally dealt with on the basis 
of the facts as they were at the time of the decision appealed against.56 In this respect, an 
appeal to the AIT is, in some cases, functionally equivalent to judicial review and in others to 
merits review as understood in the Australian system. 
 Like the SSCSCs, the AIT can make binding decisions on questions of law. In asylum 
cases the AIT has also developed a practice of issuing ‘country guidance’.57 The purpose of 
such guidance is to promote consistency and efficiency in decision-making by the AIT. It is 
formulated by senior judges of the tribunal in the context of a particular appeal that raises 
issues common to a significant number of cases coming before the tribunal and as a by-
product of deciding the appeal. Country guidance purports to provide authoritative factual 
information, relevant to deciding asylum appeals, about conditions in a particular country. 
Although country guidance has been described as ‘factual precedent’,58 it is better understood 
                                                 
54 Ibid, [13]. 
55 Ibid, [15]. 
56 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Rajendrakumar [1996] Imm AR 97. 
57 R Thomas, ‘Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the Asylum Process in the United 
Kingdom’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 489. 
58 S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] INLR 416, 435 (Laws LJ). 
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– as the word ‘guidance’ implies – as establishing relevant considerations to be taken into 
account by Immigration Judges in deciding individual asylum appeals.  
 The phenomenon of factual guidance (which, it seems, is not limited to the asylum 
context, and apparently has the approval of both the higher judiciary and the government) has 
very significant implications for understanding the role of tribunals – especially second-tier 
tribunals. In Australia, country information is provided to tribunals either by the executive or 
by research units within a tribunal itself. By contrast, the AIT has no information-gathering 
resources of its own and is dependent on the parties to a ‘country guidance appeal’ to provide 
relevant information. Moreover, as in the normal asylum appeal, the burden of proof in 
relation to such information rests on the appellant. In Australia country information is treated 
as an input to the tribunal decision-making process lacking any authoritative status. In the 
UK, by contrast, country guidance constitutes an authoritative (though not strictly binding) 
output of the process. Acceptance that tribunals (unlike courts) may appropriately make 
authoritative general statements of fact (as opposed to law) is apparently based on the 
assumption that tribunals have relevant ‘expertise’ (that courts lack); and it suggests a very 
different understanding of the role of tribunals from that prevalent in Australia (for instance). 
This assumption of expertise may also encourage the view that in supervising tribunals, 
courts should show heightened deference by interpreting the concept of an appealable ‘error 
of law’ very narrowly.59 
 A party to an appeal to the AIT may apply to a court (in England, the High Court), on 
the ground that the AIT made an error of law, for an order requiring the AIT to reconsider its 
decision.60 A party may appeal from the reconsidered decision to a court (in England, the 
Court of Appeal) on a point of law.61 On that appeal, the court may (inter alia) affirm the 
                                                 
59 R Carnwath, ‘Tribunal Justice – A New Start’ [2009] Public Law 48, 56-64. 
60 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 103A. But ‘decision’ for these purposes does not include 
‘procedural, ancillary or preliminary decisions’. 
61 Ibid, s 103B. 
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decision, make any decision the AIT could have made or remit the case to the AIT. In 
substantive terms, such an appeal is functionally equivalent to judicial review and in remedial 
terms, functionally equivalent to merits review in the Australian sense of those terms.  
 This brief consideration of the respective functions of social security and immigration 
Tribunals shows that UK law embodies a significantly less clear, uniform and developed 
understanding of the role of tribunals than that found in Australian law. It remains to be seen 
what effect the creation and operation of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals will have on the 
juridical concept of administrative adjudication. For instance, it is unclear whether and how 
the practice of giving factual guidance will prove to be reconcilable with the limitation of 
appeals to the Upper Tribunal to points of law, especially if courts interpret the concept of 
‘law’ narrowly in order to maximise the freedom of ‘expert’ tribunals from judicial control. 
4. The US 
Basic to an analysis of the role of ALJs and AJs in the US system is the fact that traditionally 
and typically, they are embedded within the agencies whose decisions they review. The 
modern history of administrative adjudication in the US is commonly traced back to the 
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887, which was a non-
departmental regulatory agency.62 To understand this history it is necessary, first, to 
distinguish between two senses of the word ‘adjudication’. The first is that adopted in this 
paper – namely resolution of disputes between citizen and government. The second meaning 
is that adopted in the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 (APA), which contrasts 
adjudication with ‘rule-making’. In this sense, adjudication – like rule-making – is a 
procedure for making ‘law’ or ‘policy’ of general application, but one that differs from rule-
making in that it involves making law or policy in the context of and incidentally to deciding 
individual cases: adjudicatory as opposed to legislative policy/law-making. From the 
                                                 
62 Classic accounts of the early history are J Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1938) and RE Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1941). 
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establishment of the ICC until the 1960s adjudication in this latter sense – that is, making 
case-by-case decisions about applications for licences, enforcement proceedings against 
individuals, and so on – was the chief method by which regulatory agencies in the US 
performed their regulatory functions: the decision of individual cases and the making of 
general policy were integrated into a single process. Technically, the power of decision in the 
individual case resides in the agency (ie the head of the agency). But from early on, as the 
volume of work increased, the ICC began63 delegating the fact-finding element of the 
decision-making process to officials who were originally called ‘hearing examiners’ and later 
‘administrative law judges’. The basic idea was that a ‘factual record’ would be generated by 
a court-like process and would form the basis for a decision by the agency whether, for 
instance, to issue a licence or impose a penalty. In time, it became increasingly common for 
the whole decision-making process to be delegated in the first instance to a hearing examiner, 
subject to review by or appeal to the agency. This is the model of adjudication embodied in 
the APA. 
 There were two important developments of present relevance in the decades following 
the enactment of the APA. One was the expansion of mass social security programs and the 
other was a wholesale shift by agencies from adjudication to rule-making as the preferred 
mode for making policy (and law). The second of these developments greatly reduced the 
importance of adjudication in the policy-making process, while the first greatly increased the 
incidence of adjudication in the sense of resolution of disputes between citizen and 
government. Although decisions about entitlement to social security benefits were technically 
made by the Social Security Administration (SSA), in practice they were initially made by 
officers in local social security offices.64 The task of reviewing contested decisions was 
                                                 
63 At first informally but after 1906 with statutory authority. 
64 The APA scheme, under which the initial decision is made by an ALJ subject to review by or appeal to the 
agency, only applies to decisions which, by statute, are required to be made after a ‘hearing on the record’. 
Typically, social security benefit decisions do not have to be made in this way.  
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delegated by the SSA to ALJs, subject to review by or appeal to the agency. At the time when 
the APA was enacted, most ALJs were engaged in adjudication in regulatory contexts, where 
it was understood as a mode of policy-making. By the 1980s most non-judicial administrative 
adjudicators were engaged in adjudication in contexts, such as social security and 
immigration, where it functioned as a mode of reviewing primary decisions made by front-
line officials. 
To the outside observer of the US system, it is striking that administrative 
adjudication – in the sense of review of primary administrative decisions – is commonly 
undertaken by officials employed by the agency responsible for making the decisions being 
reviewed.65 This arrangement is explicable by the fact that administrative adjudication in the 
US originated as an integral part of the process of making regulatory policy in the context of 
dealing with individual cases and only later became predominantly a mode of resolving 
disputes between citizen and government by reviewing initial decisions. As we saw earlier, in 
19th-century England resolution of disputes arising out of implementation of statutory 
programmes was similarly ‘embedded’ within multi-functional, non-departmental agencies. 
However, dispute resolution in this context was not understood as part of the policy-making 
(let alone the law-making) process. This helps to explain why the shift of implementation 
from non-departmental agencies to departments in England was not accompanied by a similar 
shift of adjudication. From the start, administrative adjudication in England was understood 
as essentially judicial in nature whereas in the US it started life as a component of the 
administrative process. 
 Although the APA established a scheme of internal separation of powers within 
agencies in order to limit control by the agency of the making of individual decisions and to 
establish the ‘independence’ of adjudicators, none of the many and various proposals to 
                                                 
65 In some cases, however, reviewing officials are employed by a different agency. For instance, review of 
immigration decisions is undertaken by officials employed by the Department of Justice, not the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS). 
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establish an separate ‘corps’ of adjudicators or to create an administrative court, external to 
the agencies whose decisions were under review, has borne fruit – at the federal level, 
anyway. By contrast, as we have seen, the basic model of the administrative tribunal in the 
UK and Australian systems is that of a free-standing, external reviewer of decisions made by 
a government department or agency from which the tribunal is more or less ‘independent’ 
and separated. It is only in the context of the land-use planning system in the UK that the 
model of embedded adjudication continues to operate. 
 On the other hand, the basic US understanding of what embedded administrative 
adjudicators do is closer to the UK understanding than to the Australian – and this despite the 
fact that the formal separation of powers embodied in the Australian Constitution mirrors that 
embodied in the US Constitution. In Australia, tribunals and courts are understood to be 
categorically different types of institution, and merits review is understood to be categorically 
different from judicial review, the former being a non-judicial function and the latter a 
judicial function. By contrast, in the UK tribunals and courts are understood to be essentially 
similar institutions performing an essentially similar function. Likewise, in the US, although 
the typical administrative adjudicator is embedded within an agency forming part of the 
executive branch of government, administrative adjudicators (and hence, in respect of their 
adjudicatory functions, agencies) are understood to be exercising judicial power delegated to 
them by Congress – even if not ‘the judicial power of the United States’.66 As (now) in the 
UK, non-court administrative adjudicators in the US are typically called ‘judges’ whereas in 
Australia they are called tribunal ‘members’. This difference between the US and the 
Australian understandings of the nature of tribunals and non-judicial administrative 
adjudication reflects respectively different interpretations of separation of powers by the US 
Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia. 
                                                 
66 Federal Maritime Commission v South Carolina Ports Authority 535 US 743; 122 S Ct 1864 (2002) 
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 As a result of the institutional structure of non-judicial administrative adjudication in 
the US, discussion of the role of non-judicial administrative adjudicators typically focuses on 
the relationship between adjudicators and agencies (ie agency heads) rather than on that 
between the adjudicator and primary decision-makers. Put differently, the nature of non-
judicial administrative adjudication is understood more in terms of the role of agencies in 
reviewing decisions of ALJs67 than in terms of the role of ALJs in making or reviewing initial 
decisions. In the model of administrative adjudication that underlies the provisions of the 
APA, the characteristic function of the ALJ is to develop a factual record on the basis of 
which the agency can decide relevant issues of law and policy. It is true that unless ‘the 
agency requires…the entire record to be certified to it for decision’, the ALJ has power to 
make an initial decision; but the agency has power to review that decision de novo either on 
its own motion or in response to an appeal.68 As has been noted, the APA model of 
administrative adjudication focuses on regulatory decision-making – licensing, enforcement 
and so on – rather than on decision-making about entitlement to welfare and other benefits. In 
this APA model, administrative adjudication is understood as the fact-finding stage of a 
single, integrated decision-making process. By contrast, as I have defined it in this paper, 
administrative adjudication is understood in terms of review of a decision made by a primary 
decision-maker (to whom decision-making power has been delegated by the agency). This is 
now the dominant mode of adjudication in the US, and it is with the nature of this activity 
that this paper primarily deals. 
 Although there is little explicit discussion in the US literature of the juridical nature of 
function of administrative adjudicators in reviewing contested primary decisions, it seems 
clear that the role of the adjudicator is to undertake a de novo review of the initial decision 
and to decide whether the original decision should be affirmed, varied or set aside and 
                                                 
67 And of courts in reviewing decisions of agencies. 
68 APA, s 557(b). 
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replaced by a substitute decision. That role is elaborated primarily in terms of developing a 
factual record, and the characteristic of de novo review (as opposed to an appeal) is that the 
record ‘remains open’ until the reviewer completes the review process. In Australian terms, 
de novo review is undertaken on the basis of material available to the reviewer at the time of 
the reviewer’s decision, not on the more limited basis of material available at some earlier 
time. Under the APA, if and when an agency reviews a decision by an ALJ, the agency ‘has 
all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the 
issues on notice or by rule.’69 In other words, agency review is merits review in the 
procedural sense. In the APA model, the main purpose of agency review is to enable the 
agency to exercise control over ‘policy’ by having the last word (subject to judicial review) 
on issues of statutory interpretation and the development, application and interpretation of 
extra-statutory decision-making norms. In crude terms, the APA establishes a division of 
labour between ALJs and agencies, the latter being responsible for fact-finding and the 
former for law and ‘policy’.  
 However, the respects in which this last statement is too ‘crude’ are significant. First, 
although the prime responsibility of ALJs is for fact-finding, the power to make an initial 
decision that, in the absence of review, stands as the decision of the agency, necessarily 
imports the power (and the duty) to decide relevant issues of law and ‘policy’. However, just 
as Australian merits reviewers cannot conclusively decide questions of law, so (it is said) the 
principle of stare decisis does not apply to decisions of ALJs. In other words, decisions by 
ALJs on issues of law do not create precedents that are binding on ALJs or primary decision-
makers. In this respect, the most that can be said of ALJs (as of Australian merits review 
tribunals) is that they have a legal obligation of consistency in decision-making both in 
relation to their own earlier decisions and in relation to decisions of other ALJs (and of their 
                                                 
69 Ibid. In the APA model, the power of initial decision resides in the agency, and ALJs make initial decisions as 
delegates of the agency. 
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agency when reviewing decisions by ALJs). Regarding ‘policy’ – in the sense of extra-
statutory norms – the role of the ALJ is defined by the fact that although ALJs are understood 
as performing essentially judicial tasks, they are embedded within agencies and their 
decisions are ultimately subject to de novo review by the agency. This underpins the 
proposition that the function of ALJs is to apply and give effect to extra-statutory policies 
developed by the agency. Whereas the AAT (at least in theory) has power to question and to 
act inconsistently with government policy, ALJs are understood to have no such power. 
The APA model assumed that any particular agency would undertake a relatively 
small number of adjudications, and that it would be practicable for agencies to control the 
‘policy’ element of initial decisions by reviewing individual decisions by ALJs. However, the 
enormous increase since the 1950s of administrative adjudication in areas such as 
immigration and social security made it impractical for agencies in this way to police 
compliance by adjudicators with agency policy. The large volume of adjudications in such 
areas also made it impractical for agencies to control policy through an internal mechanism 
for review of ALJ decisions by a second-tier reviewer (such as the Appeals Council in the 
social security context). An alternative strategy was to make rules that legally bound ALJs 
and to establish extra-statutory norms to guide their decision-making. In the 1970s and early 
1980s the social security administration utilised various other management techniques (such 
as performance monitoring), but these were eventually abandoned in the face of opposition 
from ALJs. 
In this area of policy review we find a fundamental difference – in principle anyway – 
between administrative adjudication in the US and merits review by the AAT in Australia. 
Although the AAT is technically part of the executive branch, its ethos is essentially judicial. 
The institutional separation of the AAT from the agencies whose decisions it reviews and its 
status as an ‘external’ reviewer provide the foundation for this assertion of ‘independence’. 
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Ironically, however, the judicial ethos of the AAT explains not only why it technically has 
the power to question government policy but also why, in practice, it is very unwilling to do 
so. Nevertheless, there is a significant contrast between the AAT and the specialist merits 
review tribunals in the areas of social security and immigration (for instance). The latter – 
and especially the immigration tribunals – although technically ‘external’ reviewers of 
agency decisions, understand their role primarily in terms of the just and consistent 
implementation of agency policy in individual cases. In this respect, there is a closer analogy 
between the specialist Australian tribunals and US administrative adjudicators than between 
the latter and the AAT. The role of US adjudicators as implementers of agency policy is 
reinforced by their embedded location within agencies. Although ALJs are understood to be 
exercising an essentially judicial function, their administrative ethos distinguishes them not 
only from Article III (constitutional) courts but also from Article 1 (legislative) courts.70 
 Fact-finding is central to the APA model of administrative adjudication, and the 
concept of a ‘hearing on the record’ provides the trigger for the application of the APA to 
administrative adjudication – the APA applies only if some other statute requires a hearing on 
the record.71 The prime function of the ALJ when reviewing primary decisions is to develop 
the record of the decision under review by an inquisitorial fact-finding process. So long as the 
record remains open to development the administrative decision-making process continues. 
In principle, when and if an agency reviews a decision of an ALJ it can develop the record in 
the same way as the ALJ can. However, in practice, agency review is typically undertaken on 
                                                 
70 CH Koch, ‘Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary’ (2005) 56 Alabama Law Review 693; JE 
Moliterno, ‘The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth’ (2006) 27 Journal of the National Association 
of the Administrative Law Judiciary 53; A Scalia, ‘The ALJ Fiasco – A Reprise’ (1979-80) 47 University of 
Chicago Law Review 58, 61-2. 
71 The APA (ss 554, 556 and 557) lays down a set of trial-type procedures for hearings on the record. 
Administrative adjudication to which the APA does not apply is generically known as ‘informal adjudication’. 
However, ‘adjudication’ in this phrase has a much wider meaning than that adopted in this paper, covering 
primary decision-making as well as review. Informal adjudication affecting ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ interests is 
subject to constitutional due process requirements that typically fall short of those applicable to a hearing on the 
record under the APA. The APA requires a hearing before the decision in question is made, whereas due process 
may be satisfied by a post-decision hearing (by way of review of the decision). See generally Strauss, 
Administrative Justice in the United States, 2nd edn (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 199-218.  
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the basis of the record developed by the ALJ; and factual issues at this stage normally 
concern inferences to be drawn from the facts rather than the primary facts themselves. 
Whether administrative adjudication is undertaken by an ALJ or by the agency itself, the 
decision is technically that of the agency; and when a court reviews a decision of an 
administrative adjudicator, technically it reviews a decision of an agency, regardless of who 
actually made the decision.  
A problem may arise where an agency reaches a different factual conclusion than that 
reached by an ALJ.72 Although the power to decide factual issues ultimately resides in the 
agency, the main function of the ALJ is to find the facts.73 Under the APA, the relevant test to 
be applied by a court in judicially reviewing a decision of an agency is whether the decision 
is supported by ‘substantial evidence’ taking into account ‘the whole record’ of the hearing.74 
The ALJ’s decision will, of course, be part of the record. As a result, in practice the formal 
freedom of an agency to reject findings of fact by an ALJ is – to some undefined extent – 
constrained by the requirement that the ALJ’s decision be given some weight. Moreover, to 
the extent that the disagreement between the agency and the ALJ relates to factual inferences 
rather than primary facts, the ability of the agency to develop policy by resolving the 
disagreement in a particular way may be limited. Although the formal task of ALJs in 
relation to agency policy is implementation, the limited freedom of agencies to disagree with 
ALJs about the proper inferences to be drawn from agreed facts may confer on ALJs a degree 
of de facto power to develop policy without interference from their agencies.75 
                                                 
72 In high-volume areas an intermediate review body may be established, the decisions of which, like those of 
ALJs, are technically decisions of the agency. Factual disagreements between an ALJ and an internal review 
body may give rise to the same problem. 
73 SG Breyer, RB Stewart, CR Sunstein and A Vermeule, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, 
Text and Cases, 6th edn (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), 214-5; JL Mashaw, RA Merrill and PM Shane, 
Administrative Law: The American Public Law System, Cases and Materials, 5th edn (St Paul, MN: Thomson 
West, 2003), 830-838. 
74 Fact-finding in cases of ‘informal adjudication’ not falling within the APA is reviewed under an ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe (1971) 401 US 402; PL Strauss, 
Administrative Justice in the United States, 348-9. 
75 I am grateful to Jerry Mashaw for discussion on this point. 
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 As in the case of administrative adjudication in the US, fact-finding lies at the heart of 
the Australian concept of merits review. Like ALJs, the AAT and other merits review 
tribunals have the power to develop the record – in other words, merits review is based on 
material available at the time of review whether or not it was available to the original 
decision-maker. In the Australian system, merits review of a decision of a first-tier merits 
review tribunals by a second-tier tribunal extends to findings of fact by the first-tier tribunal; 
but findings of fact by merits review tribunals (whether first or second tier) cannot be 
reviewed by the decision-making agency. The power of US agencies to review factual 
decisions by ALJs marks a significant difference between administrative adjudication as 
understood in the US and the Australian concept of merits review. 
5. Conclusion 
The main aim of this paper has been to develop an account of what ‘tribunals’ do that can 
provide a counterpart to existing, highly-developed and theorised accounts of what courts do 
when they engage in ‘judicial review’ of bureaucratic decision-making. I have used the 
Australian concept of ‘merits review’ as the starting point for this project because, for various 
reasons, Australian federal law embodies a much more explicit and hard-edged account of 
non-judicial review of administrative decision-making than the law of either the UK or the 
US. In Australia, tribunals are categorically different from courts, and what tribunals do – 
merits review – is categorically different from what courts do – judicial review – when they 
entertain challenges by citizens to government decisions that adversely affect them. However, 
to say that judicial review and merits review are categorically different is not to say that they 
are entirely dissimilar. For instance, both are concerned with enforcing the legal limits of 
decision-making powers; and neither concerns itself with the desirability of government 
policy, except in extreme cases.  
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 At the risk of oversimplification, we can identify three of the differences, between the 
Australian concepts of merits review and judicial review, as perhaps the most significant. 
First, the characteristic judicial review remedy is setting aside of the decision and remittal to 
the primary decision-maker for reconsideration, whereas the characteristic merits review 
remedy is setting aside of the decision and the making of new decision in substitution for it. 
Secondly, the main focus of judicial review is on issues of ‘law’ and the ‘legality’ of the 
decision, whereas the main focus of merits review is on issues of ‘fact’ and the evidentiary 
foundation of the decision. Thirdly, the characteristic function of a court undertaking judicial 
review is the negative one of scrutinizing the decision for defects whereas the characteristic 
function of a merits review tribunal is the positive one of making the correct or preferable 
decision. 
 In the UK, to the extent that there exists a general understanding of what tribunals do 
– as opposed to an understanding of what particular tribunals do – it is couched in terms of a 
distinction between ‘appeal’ and ‘review’: courts review bureaucratic decisions whereas 
tribunals hear appeals from administrative decisions. ‘Appeal’ in this context is understood to 
cover both law and fact, and ‘allowing’ the appeal effectively involves making a substitute 
decision in favour of the appellant. Courts also exercise appellate jurisdiction, and this 
explains why courts and tribunals are understood to perform an essentially similar function. 
Because of the lack of a strong separation of powers, there is no bar in UK law – as there is in 
Australian law – on courts entertaining appeals from decisions of the executive branch of 
government; and this reinforces the functional association between tribunals and courts. 
However, control by appellate courts of fact-finding by trial courts and bureaucrats is 
generally be less intense than control by tribunals of fact-finding by bureaucrats.  
 Moreover, the position has been greatly complicated by the creation of the Upper 
Tribunal. The general understanding, that tribunals exercise a broad appellate jurisdiction 
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covering both fact and law, may provide the basis for an account of what the First-tier 
Tribunal does (and of what the Upper Tribunal does in those cases in which it acts as a first-
tier tribunal); but it will not fit the Upper Tribunal, the appellate powers of which are limited 
to points of law, and which also has (limited) judicial review jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
as we have noted, when hearing appeals from decisions of the First-tier Tribunal the Upper 
Tribunal has the power to make a substitute decision. It is, I think, very uncertain whether the 
appellate function of the Upper Tribunal will be understood and developed as a form of 
broad, second-tier tribunal appeal or as a relatively narrow mode of judicial review. It also 
remains to be seen whether the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal will develop a 
unitary concept of the tribunal function analogous to the Australian concept of merits review. 
In Australia, the general concept of merits review applies regardless of the subject matter of 
the decision under review; and it also equally describes the role of second-tier and first-tier 
reviewers.76 
 Uncertainty about how UK law will develop is partly a function of the fact that the 
TCE Act regime is very new, but also of the fact that historically, the jurisdiction of the 
typical tribunal was limited to decisions made in implementation of a particular statutory 
regime. In this sense, it was a ‘specialist’, not a ‘generalist’ adjudicatory body. In the US, 
administrative adjudication is similarly organised along specialist lines. However, the APA 
embodies a general model of ‘adjudication’ on the basis of which a unitary understanding, of 
what ‘tribunals’ do, can be built. The core of that understanding is de novo reconsideration of 
decisions, focusing on the facts and keeping the record open until the reviewer decides to 
affirm the decision or to make a substitute decision. 
 It would seem, then, that making due allowances for the many differences between 
the position in our three comparator jurisdictions, two elements are common to all 
                                                 
76 Thus, when the AAT reviews the decision of a first-tier merits review tribunal, it conducts a full review of 
that decision on the merits. 
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understandings of what tribunals do: (1) full reconsideration of the facts of individual cases, 
commonly on the basis of all relevant material available to the reviewer and (2) the power to 
make a decision in substitution for the decision under review. The high intensity of review of 
fact-finding characteristic of tribunals contrasts not only with the approach by courts to 
judicial review of bureaucratic decision-making but also with the typical judicial approach to 
controlling fact-finding by inferior courts. When the Kerr Committee said that judicial review 
needed to be supplemented by general provision for ‘review on the merits’, what they 
primarily meant by ‘the merits’ (it seems) were ‘the facts’. 
 If my conclusion – that the characteristic function of tribunals is intense review of 
fact-finding – is correct, many questions suggest themselves. For instance: why should fact-
finding by bureaucrats be subject to more intense scrutiny than fact-finding by inferior 
courts? Why should this task be thought unsuitable for courts? What equips tribunals to 
undertake a task that courts do not? Is intense scrutiny of fact-finding more appropriate or 
necessary in relation to some than other categories of government decisions? If we 
understand ‘merits review’ by tribunals as an enhanced form of ‘judicial review’ by courts, 
why has the former not superseded the latter? And so on. As the comparative analysis in this 
paper has demonstrated, the answer to each of these questions (all of which raise fundamental 
issues of institutional design) is likely to vary from one jurisdiction to another. I hope that the 
analysis has also shown the value of supplementing the understandable and justifiable focus 
of administrative law scholarship on courts and judicial review with a careful look at 
tribunals, their functions and their place amongst the institutions of government. 
